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ABSTRACT 
Emergency hormonal contraception (EHC) has been available from pharmacies in 
the UK without prescription for eleven years. In the Republic of Ireland, this service 
was made available in 2011. In both jurisdictions, the respective regulators have 
included “conscience clauses”, which allow pharmacists to opt out of providing EHC 
on religious or moral grounds, providing certain criteria are met. In effect, 
conscientious objectors must refer patients to other providers who are willing to 
supply these medicines. Inclusion of such clauses leads to a cycle of cognitive 
dissonance on behalf of both parties. Objectors convince themselves of the 
existence of a moral difference between supply of EHC and referral to another 
supplier, while the regulators must feign satisfaction that a form of regulation lacking 
universality will not lead to adverse consequences in the long term.  
We contend that whichever of these two parties truly believes in that which they 
purport to, must act to end this unsatisfactory status quo. Either the regulators must 
compel all pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception to all suitable patients 
who request it, or a pharmacist must refuse to either supply EHC or to refer the 
patient to an alternate supplier, and challenge any subsequent sanctions imposed by 
their regulator. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF EHC IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 
Emergency hormonal contraception (EHC), an intervention within 72 hours of 
unprotected intercourse, dates back almost 40 years to the Yuzpe regimen.1 This 
regimen allows a woman who has had unprotected sex to avoid pregnancy by taking 
two combined doses of estrogen and progestogen separated by twelve hours. A 
licensed Yuzpe product, Schering PC4™ (50 mcg ethinyloestradiol; 250 mcg 
levonorgestrel), was available on prescription in the UK from 1984 until 2002, at 
which time it was discontinued following the introduction of progestogen-only EHC, in 
the form of the Levonelle® (1.5 mg levonorgestrel) tablet. Although Schering PC4™ 
was never licensed in the Republic of Ireland, many common combined oral 
contraceptives (COCs) could be used for the Yuzpe regimen, and Ovran® 50 tablets 
(50 mcg ethinyloestradiol; 250 mcg levonorgestrel) were commonly prescribed off-
label for this purpose. Levonelle® has been available on prescription in Ireland since 
2003. In 2011, the Irish Medicines Board issued a marketing authorisation (MA) for 
Norlevo® (1.5 mg levonorgestrel) tablets, allowing EHC to be supplied to patients 
without a prescription for the first time.2 In the UK, Levonelle® was removed from 
prescription-only control in 2001.3 It can currently be supplied against a prescrition or 
patient group direction (PGD) under the brand name Levonelle®, or over the counter 
as Levonelle® One-Step: both products contain a single 1.5mg tablet. 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF EHC 
Between 1922, when the Republic of Ireland gained independence from the UK, and 
the enactment of the Abortion Act in 1967, “procuring a miscarriage” was illegal in 
both jurisdictions under s.58 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Since 
1967, the 1861 Act continues to be the basis of a ban on abortion in Northern Ireland 
and the Republic only. 
In response to the legalisation of therapeutic abortion in England, Scotland and 
Wales by the 1967 Act, numbers of Irish women travelling to these parts of the UK 
each year to obtain an abortion increased markedly. In response to this, pro-life 
groups began to lobby for an explicit amendment to the Irish constitution banning 
abortion. In 1983, the Constitution was amended to assert that the unborn had an 
explicit right to life from the time of conception, with the Irish State guaranteeing to 
vindicate that right. In 1992, in a case involving a suicidal minor who was a statutory 
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rape victim, and who became pregnant, the Supreme Court of Ireland interpreted the 
amendment as giving a right to abortion in certain limited circumstances.4 Following 
its ruling in this case, women could more readily leave Ireland for an abortion that 
was lawful in another country. A further referendum in 1992, led to two amendments, 
which established the “right to travel” and the “right to information”.  
The “morning-after” pill is not classified as an abortifacient under UK or Irish law. In 
the case of Smeaton, the High Court of England & Wales ruled that the morning after 
pill is a form of contraception.5 The claimant attempted to assert that EHC is a 
method of early abortion and, as such, should be subject to the legislation governing 
abortion. It was argued that the supply and use of EHC involved the commission of 
criminal offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which prohibits 
the supply “of any poison or noxious thing” with intent to cause miscarriage.6 The 
judgment handed down ruled that emergency contraception is indeed lawful with 
specific reference to the fact that until an embryo has been implanted, it is not 
actually attached to the woman in any way.7 
A similar legal challenge was threatened by pro-life group “Ireland for Life” against 
the IMB’s decision to reverse its consideration that Levonelle® was an abortifacient.8 
The IMB had refused to grant an MA for Levonelle® on those grounds in 2000,9 but 
subsequently licensed the product on a prescription-only basis in 2003. This 
threatened legal challenge remained just that: to date, no judicial review of the IMB’s 
classification of Levonelle® as a contraceptive has been heard by either of Ireland’s 
Superior Courts. 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS & CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
“The religion … of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”  
James Madison (1809-1817) 
In 1792, Madison described religion as an “unalienable right”; he believed religious 
freedom was an entitlement that no earthly power could rightfully deny.10 In 
contemporary healthcare, religious affiliation has been shown to be a predictor of 
pharmacists’ willingness to dispense EHC.11 
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Leaders of numerous faith groups have expressed opinions on the topics of 
contraception and abortion. Pope Benedict XVI affirmed previous stance of the 
Catholic Church against the use of EHC when he exhorted pharmacists to act only 
such that “all human beings are protected from conception to natural death, and so 
that medicines truly play a therapeutic role”.12 Similar opinions have been expressed 
by various Jewish and Islamic faith groups.13 
In the context of EHC, we will use the term “conscientious objection” to refer to the 
refusal by a healthcare professional to comply with the request of a patient on the 
basis of their own moral or religious code. The supply of EHC has been cited as the 
unprompted ethical issue most frequently mentioned in interviews with UK-based 
community pharmacists.14 15 In the US, a 2010 study indicated that 6% of 
pharmacists would refuse to dispense prescriptions for EHC on moral grounds.11 
Many of the pharmacists in this study considered EHC to be a form of abortion, and 
claimed this outlook was due to their fundamental religious views. 
SOME ARGUMENTS FOR, AND AGAINST, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION  
Although this article does not claim to constitute a review of the arguments 
surrounding pharmacists’ right of refusal in dispensing morally-objectionable 
medications, it would be useful at this point to briefly identify some of the claims 
made on each side. 
Beauchamp and Childress argue that it is possible to identify four key ethical 
principles in the healthcare tradition, namely: autonomy; beneficence; non-
maleficence; and justice.16 Those pharmacists not wishing to supply EHC often state 
say that refusal is supported by two of these principles: autonomy and non-
maleficence.17 18 They argue that their professional autonomy is compromised when 
they are not allowed to act in line with their own conscience, in particular when doing 
so causes harm. 
In the context of the four principles, it is generally accepted that autonomy refers to 
that of the patient, rather than that of the healthcare provider, and it has been 
strongly argued that it, as a necessary component of the other three, must be given 
primacy.19 Respect for patient autonomy is a core tenet of contemporary healthcare. 
The traditional, paternalistic approach to medicine has made way for a relationship 
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based on a more fiduciary partnership between patient and professional.20 The 
obligation for healthcare professionals is to ensure that patients’ autonomous 
decisions should not be constrained by others. This can be viewed as both a 
negative and a positive obligation. While the negative obligation requires that a 
patient’s path to obtaining that which is in the best interests of their health is not 
unnecessarily impeded, the positive obligation calls for “respectful treatment in 
disclosing information and fostering autonomous decision-making”.16 Beauchamp 
and Childress mean for healthcare providers to respect patients’ decisions, even 
when these are made on the basis of inclinations, rather than a rational decision-
making process, or when they do not agree with their own.21 
The principle of non-maleficence is often quoted by those who refuse to supply EHC, 
which they contend causes harm to another person in the form of the embryo or 
foetus. As was the case with autonomy, the person to whom this principle is intended 
to apply is wilfully ignored by conscientious objectors, who choose to relate it to eight 
human cells with no ability to survive outside the body of a non-consenting adult 
female, rather than to the woman herself. 
Arguing against the right of conscientious objection, one might start by asserting 
that, if people have strong and sincere objections to performing a basic, routine 
aspect of their profession, then they shouldn’t take up that profession, and they 
certainly shouldn’t demand that the world revolve around them by adjusting the 
parameters of the work to suit themselves. What pharmacists in such cases are 
demanding is the power of veto over the liberty of others, and over the 
implementation of public policy. They are acting directly to prevent women from 
obtaining a legal and clinically-appropriate medicine because they would be unable 
achieve this goal through the normal democratic process. 
Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist, Ellen Goodman, argues that “[w]hat the 
pharmacists and others are asking for is conscience without consequence. The plea 
to protect their conscience is a thinly veiled ploy for conquest”.22 Refusing to do 
something because your conscience won’t allow it may be laudable in some cases, 
but it stops being laudable when you refuse to accept the consequences of your 
refusal. Society cannot function if people are able to ignore whatever rules, 
regulations, standards, or laws they want on the basis of “conscience” or religious 
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desire.  
For many patients, seeking emergency contraception it is a distressing experience: 
refusal may be interpreted as moral intimidation, discouraging them from seeking 
further help. Refusals also inevitably curtail a patient’s right to have appropriate & 
legal medications to treat their physical symptoms on the basis of another’s moral 
wants.23 
These arguments, however strong, have failed to remove the right of conscientious 
objection from those wishing to exercise it; nor have their counter-arguments allowed 
pharmacists to refuse to supply EHC without ensuring that set criteria are met. The 
pharmacy regulators and those dissenters from within the group whom they regulate 
have reached a point where, rather than follow their lines of reasoning through to a 
conclusion, they both espouse the existing, unsatisfactory stalemate. 
WHAT THE REGULATORS SAY 
Although the legal status of EHC is not in question, the law in this case serves only 
to remove prohibitions on supply; it does not compel any pharmacist to supply EHC 
against their own religious or moral beliefs. Statute could force pharmacists to 
provide every service legally requested, if access to treatment was more highly 
regarded than religious freedom.24 As a lesser measure, legislators could choose to 
allow individuals of conscience to exempt themselves up to a point that it creates 
hardship for the patient.25 When the law fails to provide even this level of ethical 
guidance, regulatory bodies and professional organisations must step in to remind 
pharmacists of the standard to which they, as professionals, must be held. 
Standard 3.4 of the General Pharmaceutical Council’s (GPhC) Standards of conduct, 
ethics and performance states that, as a pharmacist, one must: 
“[m]ake sure that if your religious or moral beliefs prevent you from providing a 
service, you tell the relevant people or authorities and refer patients and the 
public to other providers”.26 
Further guidance is provided in the form of the GPhC’s Guidance on the provision of 
pharmacy services affected by religious and moral beliefs.27 Pharmacists are 
reminded here that “if [they] do not supply EHC … women should be referred to an 
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alternative appropriate source of supply available within the time limits for EHC to be 
effective.” However, the guidance falls short of instructing pharmacists that, should 
they be unable to relay the patient to an alternate supplier within that timescale, that 
they must supply the EHC themselves. 
This approach is mirrored by the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland’s (PSI) Code of 
Conduct for Pharmacists, and associated guidance, which state that; 
“[i]f supply to a patient is likely to be affected by the personal moral standards 
of a pharmacist, he or she must inform their superintendent and supervising 
pharmacist, who must ensure that suitable policies and procedures are in 
place to ensure patient care is not jeopardised and the patient is facilitated in 
accessing the information or service required to meet their needs.” 
Here, again, the pharmacy regulator stops short of providing guidance to the 
pharmacist who is at the end of this line of referral from one pharmacist-unwilling-to-
dispense-a-legal-medicine to another.  
The primacy of the pharmacist’s duty of care to their patient is acknowledged by both 
the British and Irish regulators, both of whom make this the first principle of their 
respective codes of ethics.26 28 The PSI even go so far as to state that “[t]his is the 
primary principle and the following principles must be read in light of this principle.” 
Indeed, a recent study of pharmacy codes of conduct from English-speaking 
jurisdiction the primacy of patient care was paramount in 28 out of the 34 codes 
examined.29 Although the important distinction between objection and obstruction 
seems to be recognised by the regulatory bodies,23 they lack the impetus to follow 
their assertions through to their logical conclusion. 
The UK and Ireland are not alone in this lack of leadership: the American 
Pharmacists Association (APhA) also compromises on the issue. APhA’s policy 
supports the ability of a pharmacist to opt out of providing a service for personal 
reasons, as long as the patient’s access to appropriate health care is not disrupted. 
That is to say, its policy supports a pharmacist “stepping away” from participating but 
not “stepping in the way” of the patient accessing the treatment.30  
DISCUSSION 
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Unlike more classical cases of conscientious objection, such as refusal to carry out 
abortions, restricting access to EHC often involves denying the patient access to 
effective treatment, due the relatively narrow windows in which it is effective. Despite 
the fact that, “objecting pharmacists themselves embrace the moral difference 
between [supplying EHC] and allowing [it to be supplied]”,31 replacing a duty to 
dispense EHC with a duty to refer to a pharmacist who is willing so do to “does not 
remove the pharmacist from the causal chain of events that leads to the use of 
[EHC]”.32 Even if the use of EHC does constitute abortion to these pharmacists, 
signposting a patient (or ‘offender’) to another pharmacist who is willing to make the 
supply does not prevent its use in the vast majority of cases. Wicclair suggests the 
following conditions must be met in order to ascribe moral complicity to one 
healthcare practitioner referring a patient to another for treatment that the first 
practitioner considers unethical: 
1. Disclosure of the option and provision of a referral; 
2. Acceptance of the treatment by the patient following referral is a reasonably 
foreseeable outcome; 
3. The referral contributed to the unethical behaviour of the second 
practitioner.33 
In the context of EHC, all three of these conditions are met: the objecting pharmacist 
is required to make the referral; the patient is seeking the treatment, so acceptance 
is probable; and without a patient the second pharmacist in unable to engage in 
practices deemed unethical by the first. A true defender of a pharmacists’ right to 
conscientious objection should see no ethical difference between dispensing the 
medication and enabling another willing pharmacist to do so. In either case, the 
result is the same. The situation is morally no different than refusing to supply 200 
paracetamol tablets to a depressed customer for the purpose of committing suicide, 
but explaining to him that he can purchase 16 tablets in each of the dozen 
newsagents in the surrounding area. If they do not believe that paracetamol should 
be put to this purpose, then they must remove themselves entirely from the chain of 
supply. When it comes to EHC, however, their objections are not absolute. 
Kelleher argues that such pharmacists would be morally required to dispense [EHC] 
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if this would lead to the frustration of two additional requests by two other customers 
at two other pharmacies”. This may seem to many like a purely hypothetical 
situation, but if all stock in a given geographical area is drawn from the same 
wholesaler, whom has limited stock, the dispensing of a double dose to a single 
patient could deplete the available supply, thus ensuring two other requests go 
unmet. The Faculty of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care of the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) has produced guidance on the 
issue of use of levonorgestrel for emergency contraception in women who are 
concurrently using liver enzyme inducing drugs, which advises that an increased 
single dose of 2.25 mg (equivalent to one-and-a-half tablets) should be taken.34 Why, 
then, are these pharmacists so conscientious in their objection? Why is their 
rejection not absolute? It would appear that religious belief is paramount as long as it 
does not incur any serious financial penalty, such as may result from a fitness to 
practice investigation, or having to defend oneself against an aggrieved patient in the 
courts. 
On the other side of this unfortunate stalemate are the regulators. The GPhC and 
PSI have created a “pass the buck” system that does not preclude conscientious 
objection; rather this makes it extremely unlikely that a patient will not have access to 
EHC, albeit following the indignity of being morally judged by those whose duty it is 
to see to their healthcare needs. However, as making something extremely unlikely 
is not the same as precluding it, this system lacks universality. 
From the perspectives of both moral defensibility and legal practicality, any rules or 
regulations governing the supply of EHC must be universally applicable. Kant’s first 
formulation of the categorical imperative requires that one “[a]ct only according to 
that maxim whereby [one] can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law without contradiction”.35  This has practical, as well as philosophical, advantages: 
those charged with the regulation of a profession such as pharmacy could not be 
expected to draft bespoke codes of conduct for each of their members; rather they 
are required to compose a single set of standards to which all members must be 
held. 
It would be wholly unacceptable to allow pharmacist to refuse patients in a city, 
where pharmacies abound, but to forbid them to do so in the countryside, where 
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large distances may separate them. What is required, then, are standards that 
ensure every woman who fulfils the criteria for EHC should be able to obtain it within 
the effective timescale without exception. The current standards in both the UK and 
Ireland would allow most, but not all, women to obtain EHC from a pharmacy 
following, at worst, being subject to the moral judgment to which we earlier alluded. 
However, although both parties are desperately trying to avoid a situation that would 
expose the flaws in their respective arguments, regulators and objectors alike must 
be acknowledged the existence of such a scenario: a woman walks into a rural 
pharmacy almost 72 hours after unprotected intercourse and asks for EHC from a 
pharmacist who does not wish to supply it on religious grounds. With the option of 
referral removed, the pharmacist must make a decision between his belief and his 
professional duty. If he decides to supply, he reveals to himself that his religious 
principles are secondary to the practice of his profession; if he refuses, he faces 
possible disciplinary action, and the regulator may have failed in their duty of care to 
a member of the public, as this situation might have been avoided through stronger 
regulation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Pharmacy may be regarded as a profession as its members are bound by regulated 
standards of education and a code of conduct. A central tenet of professionalism is 
the relationship of trust between the practitioner and their patient. The fiduciary 
nature of this relationship requires the pharmacist to put the interests of the patient 
ahead of their own. If a pharmacist denies a service to a patient, the relationship of 
trust and respect may be put in jeopardy.  
The current status quo is not satisfactory to either conscientious objectors, or to 
those who must regulate them. The former have allowed themselves to be convinced 
that referral to another willing supplier is ethically any different from supply, while the 
latter merely postpone the inevitable incidence of a pharmacist refusing to supply 
EHC to a patient for whom referral is not an option. Both groups fall back on strong 
arguments in support of the position that they believe they hold: however, until each 
accepts the fact that that the current situation supports neither stance, patient care is 
philosophically compromised.  
Either the GPhC and PSI must compel all pharmacists to dispense emergency 
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contraception to all patients meeting the clinical criteria whom request it, regardless 
of their own moral or religious objections; or a pharmacist must refuse both to supply 
EHC and to refer the patient to an alternate supplier, and confront the possible 
consequence of a complaint against them for poor professional performance or 
professional misconduct. The alternative is to remain locked in the current cycles of 
mutual cognitive dissonance, wherein the objectors convince themselves that referral 
does not constitute supply, and the regulators do not place themselves in the 
position of having to deal with a vocal religious minority of whom they are terrified. 
As it stands, neither side wants the high-hanging grapes, as they will be sour 
anyway. 
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